A variety of reasons underpin scepticism vs human rights: from ontological questions about the very notion of rights, to culture and religion-based perceptions of rights as an illegitimate source of external interference; from concerns about pragmatic application, to doubts about the political neutrality of Human Rights. Why is it important to engage with different expressions of scepticism?
Engaging with human rights scepticism, the first series in the Global Campus “To the Righthouse” podcast programme, proposes thought-provoking answers to critical questions and concerns.
“Voices of scepticism resonate widely with decision-makers and members of the public. How the issues are framed cannot be left to the detractors” says George Ulrich, the podcast host. “Discussing perceived or real weaknesses with antagonists may increase the motivation for further actions. By meaningfully connecting theory to reality, such a mutual exchange of ideas may bring us a step further towards a vision for the future guided by a deep and resilient understanding of the nature and functions of human rights and their application in a contemporary geopolitical setting.”
Listen on as he explores these ideas with renowned guests: Lotte Leicht, Guy Haarscher, Anndini Ramanujam, Jerald Joseph, Koen De Feyter, Paul Gready, Samuel Moyn, Manfred Nowak, Costas Douzinas.
Are human rights real? How do they exist?
Ontological scepticism questions the very being of universal human rights. In its most explicit form, it asserts that human rights do not exist. As famously stated by the British moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre in response to the proclamation of rights belonging to all human beings merely on account of being human: ‘there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.’
Contemporary critics have, on a variety of related counts, expressed doubt about the concept of universal human rights for example questioning whether the abstract idea of humanity can ground a comprehensive and inclusive normative framework committed to social justice.
What such expressions of ontological scepticism confront human rights advocates with, above all, is the need to seriously reflect on the concept of human rights. The issue is not in a trivial sense whether human rights exist but rather how they exist, where they derive from, and what renders them normatively compelling.
LLB (Athens) LLM PhD (London) is a Professor of Law and Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities. He joined the Department in 1992 and was Head of Department from 1996 to 2002. Costas was educated in Athens during the Colonels’ dictatorship where he joined the student resistance. He left Greece in 1974 and continued his studies in London, where he received his Master’s in Law and PhD degrees from LSE and, in Strasbourg, where he received the degree for teachers of Human Rights. He taught at Middlesex, Lancaster and Birkbeck where he was appointed in 1992 as a member of the team which established the Birkbeck School of Law. Professor Douzinas is a visiting Professor at the University of Athens and has held visiting posts at the Universities of Paris, Thessaloniki and Prague. In 1997 he was awarded a Jean Monnet fellowship by the European University Institute, Florence. In 1998 he was a visiting fellow at Princeton University and at the Cardozo School of Law. In 2002, he was a Fellow at Griffith University, Brisbane and at the Universities of Beijing and Nanjing.
Are human rights politically neutral? Does proliferation of human rights water down the very concept?
Expressions of political scepticism about human rights may involve an assessment both of how human rights claims feed into and affect political processes and, conversely, the role of politics in facilitating the realisation of human rights. Political sceptics contend that human rights claims are politics in disguise, have a disruptive influence on political processes, or divert attention from urgently needed political action.
A distinct but related form of political scepticism is linked with the idea of a proliferation of human rights, which acknowledges that certain ‘fundamental’ rights constitute valid universal standards, but contends that the notion of universal human rights is being extended much too far in contemporary discourse, thus watering down and potentially compromising the underlying concept.
Should human rights maintain a presumption of political neutrality or should they rather make common cause with particular political agendas, for example related to the redistribution of wealth and affirmative action in relation to public goods and access?
is the Kent Professor of Law and History at Yale University, where he also serves as head of Grace Hopper College. Trained in modern European intellectual history, he works on political and legal thought in modern times and on constitutional and international law in historical and current perspective. His most recent book is “Liberalism against Itself: Cold War Intellectuals and the Making of Our Times” (Yale University Press, 2023), based on the Carlyle Lectures in the History of Political Thought at the University of Oxford. He spent a decade writing some books about the history of international law and human rights: “The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History” (Harvard University Press, 2010); “Christian Human Rights“(Penn Press, 2015), based on Mellon Distinguished Lectures at the University of Pennsylvania in fall 2014; “Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World” (Harvard, 2018); and “Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War” (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2021). Currently he is working on (different) projects on aging and politics constitutionalism and democracy, and the Vietnam war.
Are human rights an unrealistic luxury?
Pragmatically-oriented expressions of human rights scepticism do not take issue with the concept of human rights as such. Rather, they question the relevance and efficacy of human rights in particular settings. They may acknowledge that human rights express a noble ideal to which one can aspire, but in current circumstances it is a luxury that society cannot afford.
This argument is based on the implicit premise that compliance with human rights inevitably happens at the expense of other societal objectives, notably economic progress and national security and stability, and conversely, that the prioritisation of such objectives sometimes necessitates a disregard for human rights.
An obvious response is to seek to demonstrate that the given societal objectives can be realised in a human rights compliant fashion. However, in order to be convincing, this needs to be demonstrated in concrete terms in the actual situations that people inhabit. The devil here lies in the detail: How to constructively negotiate such tensions?
is Professor of Public International Law and Spokesperson of the Research Group on Law and Development at the University of Antwerp (Belgium). He currently serves as a member of the United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Right to Development. His main research areas are international law and sustainable development, and human rights in non-Western contexts.
is the Director of the Centre for Applied Human Rights (CAHR) and co-editor of the Journal of Human Rights Practice. Flagship programmes at CAHR include supporting York to become the UK’s first ‘Human Rights City’, and a Protective Fellowship Scheme for human rights defenders at risk and associated research. Paul’s research interests include transitional justice, human rights cities, and universities as sites of protection.
Whose values? Whose experience? Are human rights inclusive?
Value-based objections to human rights are commonly stated with reference to culture and/or religion. They may further be linked with a claim that human rights are shaped by and express distinctly Western values.
The perception of a certain degree of incompatibility between human rights standards and prevailing cultural norms is widespread and not adequately answered by arguments at the theoretical level. While cultural traditions indeed are dynamic and shaped both by external influences and internal contestations, it must by the same token be acknowledged that value transformations happen slowly and that points of friction between local values and international human rights norms cannot be overcome all at once.
It therefore makes sense for human rights advocates to ask themselves how to react in practical terms to such concerns and focus on preventing the most egregious abuses while seeking to find points of compatibility that bring human rights close to home.
is a Commissioner and currently Vice-Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM). For the last 30 years, he has been a human rights defender and trainer consultant at both local and international levels on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, elimination of racial discrimination, and economic, social and cultural rights. He holds a Master’s of Human Rights from Mahidol University.
is the Co-Director and Director of Programs of the Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism at McGill University’s Faculty of Law. She is the McGill representative for the Scholars at Risk Network and served on the Steering Committee of the Scholars at Risk Network, Canada section from 2016-22. Her research and teaching interests include Law and Development, Institutions and Governance, Economic Justice, Food Security and Food Safety, the role of civil society and the Fourth Estate (Media) in promotion of the rule of law, as well as the exploration of interconnections between field based human rights work and theoretical discourses.
Human Rights under pressure: when, why and how to engage with sceptics?
In the current era of rising illiberalism and backlash against hard won human rights standards, there is a pressing need to stand firm, hold governments to their agreed international obligations and adopt a confrontational ‘naming and shaming’ approach to abuses and critics of Human Rights.
If this is a pertinent reaction in many situations, it should also be recognised that voices of scepticism may express valid concerns. There may be something important to be learnt from carefully listening to critical voices. This said, there are clearly also voices of opposition to human rights and patterns of neglect and abuse that call for resolute resistance.
As it is not clear how best to calibrate and balance the different available approaches, our series starts with the following question: is it possible to determine when to adopt an adversarial ‘naming and shaming’ approach towards detractors and when to engage in constructive good faith interaction with exponents of scepticism towards human rights?
is an emeritus professor at the Free University of Brussels (ULB), where he taught moral, political, and legal philosophy and served as Chair of the Center for Philosophy of Law and Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. A visiting professor in various Universities in Europe and the United States, he teaches the philosophy of human rights within the framework of the European Master’s in Human Rights and Democratization (EMA) at the Global Campus of Human Rights.
is Climate Rights International’s Advocacy Director. Before joining CRI, Lotte was Human Rights Watch’s European Union Director from 1994 to 2021. She has had a long and very distinguished career in human rights conducting numerous human rights and humanitarian law investigations in various conflict zones around the world and leading successful advocacy efforts on the establishment of new international, regional and national accountability and justice mechanisms. Lotte is also a member of the Steering Committee of the Global Campus of Human Rights and the Right Livelihood joint project on children’s rights, climate change and justice.