In July 2013, President Salva Kiir sacked his cabinet and the Vice President, Dr Riek Machar. On 15 December 2013, after months of tense political atmosphere, fighting erupted in Juba between the forces loyal to President Kiir, a Dinka, and his then Vice President Machar, a Nuer. Subsequently, Dr Machar fled Juba and formed a rebel movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A-IO), with its political wing, the SPLM-O, becoming the main opposition party, splitting from the mainstream Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which is the ruling party, under the auspices of President Kiir. This first phase of civil war was ended by the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015, which collapsed in July 2016 when the forces of President Kiir again clashed with the bodyguards of Dr Machar at the Presidential Palace ‘Juba One’, compelling him to flee Juba for the second time in a span of less than three years.
On 12 September 2018, the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed, ending a civil war that lasted for nearly five years. The R-ARCSS ushered in new hopes for nation-building, democratic governance, rule of law, institutional reforms, and the need to redress the past wrongs through the transitional justice mechanisms.
However, in mid-February 2025, there was a twist of events when the government commenced the deployment of troops (including ‘allied ethnic militias’ which had not been part of the formal unification process) to carry out a forced disarmament campaign in Nasir, a county situated in the Upper Nile State, South Sudan. The White Army (a band of ‘armed youths’ which fought alongside, and somewhat affiliated with, the SPLA-IO in 2013 and 2016) perceived the disarmament as ‘ethnically driven’ and violently resisted it, initially resulting in some losses on both sides. The White Army is a militia composed mainly of civilians from the Nuer communities living in swampy areas around the Nile. In particular, the attack launched on a market in Nasir by the White Army on 14 February killed at least 21 people and displaced thousands. While urging youth to disperse, the government troops launched airstrikes on SPLA-IO positions on 25 February, which also hit civilian areas.
The gains brought by the R-ARCSS, spanning relative stability, legislative and institutional reforms, among others, are likely to be thrown into the dustbin after the Nasir bloody hostilities. These confrontations and their aftermath will, unless there is a political compromise, put the R-ARCSS on a ticking time bomb as the country is on the brink of another full-scale civil war.
Against this background, the present post underscores the implications of the Nasir confrontations between the government forces and the White Army on the ‘permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements’ under the R-ARCSS. It is worth addressing how the escalated tensions and violence blatantly challenge international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), taking into account the related obligations of the parties concerned. Some considerations on the desirable pathway are then made.
Reflecting on the aftermath of the clashes in Nasir
Before and on 7 March 2025, the aforementioned violence evolved, with the government garrison overran by the White Army, and resulted in hundreds of casualties, including the killing of Major General Majur Dak, commander of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) personnel. As a result, key figures of SPLM/A IO were detained, some suspended, and since September 2025 Dr Riek Machar and the other seven leaders of SPLM/A-IO have faced trial in a Special Court as they have been charged with murder, treason and crimes against humanity stemming from their alleged involvement in these attacks against federal forces.
The fueled clashes in Nasir witnessed indelibly horrible casualties never experienced anywhere across the country since the signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018. This leaves the agreement, particularly the fate of its Chapter II (on permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements), within a process that has been staggering and is somewhat stuck now, in a quagmire. In principle, under Article 2.1.4 of the R-ARCSS, the permanent ceasefire applies to former ‘warring parties’ and ‘other forces and militias affiliated to each party’, and it is premised on the protection of civilians and the facilitation of humanitarian access. This is augmented by Article 2.1.10.1 of the R-ARCSS, which proscribes actions which ‘delay or impede’ human rights and humanitarian services. Furthermore, Article 2.1.10.5 of the ARCSS echoes the preceding provisions by prohibiting attacks or violence against the civilian population and UNMISS personnel’s installations and equipment. In conformity with the R-ARCSS, the parties are obliged at all times to respect and fully comply with IHL.
In this context, it is indispensable to comprehend whether the White Army is a non-state actor or an affiliated militia to the SPLA-IO, a military wing of the SPLM-IO. During the cited conflicts in 2013 and 2016, the White Army fought alongside the SPLA-IO forces. However, this narrative has now shifted, with the government asserting that the militia is still affiliated with the SPLA-IO. Instead, the SPLM/A IO contends that the White Army is a civilian armed group with no current link to their movement. All these claims and counterclaims by the government and SPLM/A IO can only be properly understood after the cited Special Court will make a fair and impartial decision on the status of the White Army.
All being said, it must be highlighted that the allegedly indiscriminate bombardment of Nasir, Longechuk, and Ulang counties of Upper Nile State, by the government forces, which led to the killing of about 58 civilians, including children, and the destruction of civilian structures, violates the principles of distinction and against indiscriminate attacks under IHL Customary Rules 1, 7, and 11, as well as IHRL. In this last regard, the bombing deprived the civil population of the rights to life, health, education, property, and protection from violence, which are enshrined in Articles 4, 14, 16, 17(1), and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR); Articles 6, 19, 24, 28, and 29 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Articles 12 and 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These treaties were ratified by South Sudan, but the latter seems to disregard its binding obligations to respect and protect human rights at all times.
On the other hand, pending judicial determination of the White Army status by the Special Court, its actions on 7 March 2025, which include the attack on the UNMISS helicopter and the killing and injuring of UNMISS personnel, as well as over two dozen of South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) soldiers and Major General Majur Dak, may constitute war crimes.
Looking ahead
The Nasir turmoil leaves the R-ARCSS in a fragile state and South Sudan prone to another episode of civil war, thus burying the gains of the agreement underneath. The aftermath of the Nasir confrontation between the government forces and the White Army has led to an escalation of violence, with actual risk of serious violations of IHRL and IHL.
To avoid relapse into another civil war, the parties should resolve the current political and security deadlock and recommit themselves to a full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS, which is the only viable option to achieving long-lasting peace and stability, and which can guarantee the enjoyment of human rights. In this regard, there is a need to release all political detainees, revitalise political dialogue, engage in inclusive and consensual decision-making, and fully activate the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. As such, it is vital to speed up the transitional security arrangement, particularly, the unification and deployment of the ‘Necessary Unified Forces’.
Moreover, the formation of transitional justice mechanisms should be accelerated. Specifically, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) should redouble its efforts to collaborate with the African Union Commission’s Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) in making the final guidelines for forming the Hybrid Court of South Sudan and detailing the modalities for truth, reconciliation, compensation, and reparation processes.
The government should also endeavour to enhance the protection of civilians and renew trust between the communities and the SSPDF, which requires incorporating the views of the community into the security plans and ‘ending impunity for abuses’.
To achieve the foregoing, the R-TGoNU should stabilise ‘the political, economic and security landscape’, which includes key prerequisites for restoring state authority. These aspects are necessary for the conduct of credible, free, and fair elections.
